Describes one method of programming development funds at a sub-national level to positively effect a counterinsurgency, using the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team as its model.

"Veteran war correspondent Ann Scott Tyson first met Special Forces Major James Gant and heard about his battle renown when he was awarded the Silver Star several years ago. Soon after, in October, 2009, Gant rocked the US military establishment with his paper "One Tribe at a Time, " an incendiary criticism of what he considered a gaping hole in U.S. strategy: The failure to engage Afghanistan's powerful Pashtun tribes on the eastern border with Pakistan. The article went viral at the Pentagon, the White House, and Capitol Hill and landed in the New York Times. It was even compared to David Hackworth's public and legendary opposition to military command during the Vietnam War (recounted in his massive bestseller, About Face). After much infighting among US military brass, Gant was finally tasked with a job he'd wanted for a long time, the chance to join Afghan tribes in the fight against the Taliban. Top level US military leaders (including Gen. Petraeus) asked him to recruit and lead a force of hundreds of Pashtun tribal fighters--a mission unlike any that had been tried before. Gant and his men lived among the Pashtun not as Americans, but as Afghans: They wore what the natives wore, slept where they slept, and died for the tribe, if necessary. They were told: "No one can leave until the mission is complete." The more time Tyson spent with Gant in preparation for his deployment, the more she grew to believe that there was a larger story to tell--about a people desperate to defend their homeland against insurmountable odds, and about Gant the man and the warrior. She began to share his vision that Americans could fight alongside the Pashtuns and turn the tide of the war. Soon she agreed to accompany him to Afghanistan and risk her life to write about it. And then love"--

"Veteran war correspondent Ann Scott Tyson first met Special Forces Major James Gant and heard about his battle renown when he was awarded the Silver Star several years ago. Soon after, in October, 2009, Gant rocked the US military establishment with his paper "One Tribe at a Time, " an incendiary criticism of what he considered a gaping hole in U.S. strategy: the failure to engage Afghanistan's powerful Pashtun tribes on the eastern border with Pakistan. The article went viral at the Pentagon, the White House, and Capitol Hill and landed in the New York Times. After much infighting among US military brass, Gant was finally tasked with a job he'd wanted for a long time, the chance to join Afghan tribes in the fight against the Taliban.Gant and his men lived among the Pashtun as Afghans: they wore what the natives wore, slept where they slept, and died for the tribe, if necessary."--

"Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The U.S. established security throughout the country--killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa'ida's senior operatives--and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001, planning for the Iraq War siphoned resources and personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. Jones introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. He then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence"--From book jacket.

"The short publication covers the U.S. Army's activities in Afghanistan from January 2009 to August 2011. This time period is often referred to as the Afghan Surge. During this time period the United States sent additional troops (a surge) to Afghanistan hoping for similar results to a similar tactic in Iraq"--

Jake Tapper exposes the origins of one of the Afghan War's deadliest battles for U.S. forces and details the stories of soldiers heroic and doomed, shadowed by the recklessness of their commanders in Washington, D.C. and a war built on constantly shifting sands.

"As U.S. troops prepare to withdraw, the shocking tale of how the American military had triumph in sight in Afghanistan--and then brought the Taliban back from the dead. In the popular imagination, Afghanistan is often regarded as the site of intractable conflict, the American war against the Taliban a perpetually hopeless quagmire. But as Anand Gopal demonstrates in this stunning chronicle, top Taliban leaders were in fact ready to surrender within months of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, renouncing all political activity and submitting to the new government. Effectively, the Taliban ceased to exist--yet the American forces were not ready to accept such a turnaround. Driven by false intelligence from corrupt warlords and by a misguided conviction that Taliban members could never change sides, the U.S. instead continued to press the conflict, resurrecting the insurgency that persists to this day. Gopal's dramatic narrative, full of vivid personal detail, follows three Afghans through years of U.S. missteps: a Taliban commander, a U.S.-backed warlord, and a housewife trapped in the middle of the fighting. With its intimate accounts of life in small Afghan villages, and harrowing tales of crimes committed by Taliban leaders and American-supported provincial officials alike, No Good Men Among the Living lays bare the workings of America's longest war and the truth behind its prolonged agony. A thoroughly original expose; of the conflict that is still being fought, it shows just how the American intervention went so desperately wrong"--

" This publication is a compilation of nine essays written by Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force officers enrolled in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands program while attending the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National Defense University (NDU. All the officers have extensive experience on Afghanistan and were encouraged to combine this experience with their newly acquired knowledge of theory and history to produce essays that could provide both cutting-edge analysis of our current operations in Afghanistan and deeper insights about counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations. -- From Introduction.

From GPO Bookstore: Contains an anthology of sixteen oral histories that chronicle the establishment of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan. Includes a lengthy interview with Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, the first commander of the new headquarters, in which he discusses the strategic challenges of Afghanistan, the coordination of political and military efforts by his command, and the development and implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy that considered the complexity of the Afghan insurgency.

An account of the horrendous October 2009 attack on the American Combat Outpost Keating in Afghanistan, told in a frank, engaging vernacular by the staff sergeant and Medal of Honor winner. Romesha ably captures the daily dangers faced by these courageous American soldiers in Afghanistan.--