| Racism -- Moral and ethical aspects. |
| Race discrimination. |
| Social ethics. |
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Library | Material Type | Call Number | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
Searching... A C Bilbrew Library | Book | 305.8 | Searching... Unknown |
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Summary
Summary
Not all racial incidents are racist incidents, Lawrence Blum says. "We need a more varied and nuanced moral vocabulary for talking about the arena of race. We should not be faced with a choice of 'racism' or nothing." Use of the word "racism" is pervasive: An article about the NAACP's criticism of television networks for casting too few "minority" actors in lead roles asks, "Is television a racist institution?" A white girl in Virginia says it is racist for her African-American teacher to wear African attire.Blum argues that a growing tendency to castigate as "racism" everything that goes wrong in the racial domain reduces the term's power to evoke moral outrage. In "I'm Not a Racist, But..." , Blum develops a historically grounded account of racism as the deeply morally-charged notion it has become. He addresses the question whether people of color can be racist, defines types of racism, and identifies debased and inappropriate usages of the term. Though racial insensitivity, racial anxiety, racial ignorance and racial injustice are, in his view, not "racism," they are racial ills that should elicit moral concern.Blum argues that "race" itself, even when not serving distinct racial malfeasance, is a morally destructive idea, implying moral distance and unequal worth. History and genetic science reveal both the avoidability and the falsity of the idea of race. Blum argues that we can give up the idea of race, but must recognize that racial groups' historical and social experience has been shaped by having been treated as if they were races.
Reviews: (3)
Publisher's Weekly Review
Media, politicians, social and political groups and individuals use the term "racism" casually and inaccurately, thereby stripping the concept of its meaning, argues Lawrence Blum in I'm Not a Racist, But...: The Moral Quandary of Race. Not all interracial difficulties involve racism, he contends, but society does not have the vocabulary to discuss racial overtones with greater subtlety. Thus people and institutions fearful of being called racist feel defensive when racial issues are raised, perpetuating the status quo of race relations. Blum (Moral Perception and Particularity), professor of philosophy and of liberal arts and education at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, asserts that only "certain especially serious moral failings and violations" merit the designation "racism." Discussing various scholarly perspectives on the construction of racial categories, Blum calls for a balance between "ridding ourselves of the myth of race" and understanding the role of race in social inequality and in history. (Feb.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Booklist Review
The term racism has been so overused that it is in danger of losing its moral significance, according to philosophy professor Blum, who argues for clearer, more precise use of the word and related terminology. Blum examines related concepts and terms --institutional racism, personal racism, racist, racist beliefs--and their interplay as he explores the moral implications of racism on a multiplicity of levels. A section on "colorblindness" is especially enlightening, given the often-contradictory use of the concept. The author surveys the history of the concept of race and its associated development with the enslavement of Africans. While he argues that "race," as we generally use that term, does not exist, racialized groups as socially constructed do, with import and consequences often associated with that term. Blum recognizes the ideal of abandoning use of the concept of race, but also acknowledges the practical need to remedy wrongs of the past and present. This is a very thoughtful work on a sensitive subject, a good and practical work for all readers interested in race relations. --Vernon Ford
Choice Review
Few topics are in such desperate need of clear analysis as the subject of race, and on few topics are the academically permissible lines of reflection as sharply drawn. In this concise volume, Blum (Univ. of Massachusetts, Boston) brings the precision of a moral philosopher to bear on this perennial American dilemma, with generally helpful results. He interacts with a wide range of popular and academic sources, opposing our cultural exaggeration about racism ("conceptual inflation," he calls it) and questioning the moral and practical legitimacy of race as an organizing social category in the US today. Blum's sensitivity to the complexities of his topic is refined and admirable, but his inquiry stops short of frankly considering whether a bureaucratized and racially manipulative "civil rights establishment" is fomenting the very rigid and simplistic lines of social conversation that he bemoans. Discussion of this claim, advanced by influential black writers that Blum does not engage--including Shelby Steele, John McWhorter, Thomas Sowell, and Robert L. Woodson--would have added further nuance to Blum's already substantive and creative survey. A fresh and important contribution to applied social philosophy, recommended for general readers, upper-division undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty. B. Stetson Azusa Pacific University
Table of Contents
| Preface | p. vii |
| 1. "Racism": Its Core Meaning | p. 1 |
| 2. Can Blacks Be Racist? | p. 33 |
| 3. Varieties of Racial Ills | p. 53 |
| 4. Racial Discrimination and Color Blindness | p. 78 |
| 5. "Race": What We Mean and What We Think We Mean | p. 98 |
| 6. "Race": A Brief History, with Moral Implications | p. 109 |
| 7. Do Races Exist? | p. 131 |
| 8. Racialized Groups and Social Constructions | p. 147 |
| 9. Should We Try to Give Up Race? | p. 164 |
| Notes | p. 179 |
| Bibliography | p. 231 |
| Index | p. 247 |